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  ABSTRACT  
 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a comparative study of American public 
education strategies in two of its colonial possessions at the beginning of the 20th century. 
The United States defeated the Spanish in 1899 and took over the Philippines and Puerto 
Rico, both of which shared a long history of Spanish rule. Victory in the war with Spain 
propelled the United States into the ranks of the imperial club and posed challenges 
greater than any encountered in the conquest of the native Americans and the West. At 
the time of Spain’s defeat Filipinos had already taken up arms against the Spanish while 
Puerto Ricans had won concessions through negotiation and both looked forward to 
independence; however, the U.S. intention to retain lands that they felt had been won 
fairly in battle dashed such hopes. Before President McKinley could apply American-
style, liberal, republican governance to what he and most Anglo-Saxons viewed as the 
less civilized natives of these territories, the army had to quell an armed Filipino 
resistance and lay the groundwork for a colonial government. Offering free public 
education became a key component of a U.S. strategy to create compliant citizens and at 
the same time shrink the ranks of those willing to take up arms against American rule. 
American attempts to expand the availability of education in the Philippines, scene of 
some of the most ferocious fighting, have received a lot of praise mainly for its nobility 
and accomplishments. However, judging the effort based upon the original goal of
 iv 
  
creating an educated populace capable of taking its leaders to task reveals shortcomings. 
This thesis compares American public education in the Philippines with the 
system implemented in Puerto Rico. It has been over a century since Admiral Dewey 
entered Manila Bay, but a study of the strategies used in the American territories can still 
provide lessons today. Nations, including the U.S., continue to invade other countries for 
various reasons, stated and otherwise. Invariably, some form of rebuilding occurs after an 
invasion and are presented as concise steps leading to a preferred outcome. Looking back 
at early American imperialism in the Philippines and Puerto Rico provides evidence that 
plans, even those that are the centerpiece of a strategy, remain very malleable- pushed, 
pulled and sometimes broken due to the exertions of those who claim an interest or 
instead may be threatened. The influence of native leaders, colonial administrators, U.S. 
politicians, and corporations all played a part in determining the successes and failures of 
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The purpose of this thesis is to show that education as a means of social change 
ceased to be a vital aspect of the American administrations in the Philippines and Puerto 
Rico. Legislation and policies that led to Puerto Ricans being granted citizenship and 
Filipinos a path to independence limited the purpose of public education. Officially, the 
U.S. colonial administrations still emphasized the importance of education and attempted 
to enlarge student populations, but in both cases the results after twenty years of rule 
were poor and not effectively resolved.  
Americans arrived in the Philippines with high-minded ideas of indoctrinating 
Filipinos in Jeffersonian republican ideals that eventually had to be dropped. Initially, 
soldiers taught basic lessons to win over hearts and minds during a violent insurrection by 
Filipino nationalists. Hundreds of American teachers followed and were sent across the 
countryside to teach and convince Filipinos of the good intentions of their new rulers. 
Education would be the means that poor Filipinos could resist corrupt leaders. However 
the cost of the war, resistance of Filipino elites and political dissension at home reduced 
American enthusiasm for formal imperialism. Rather than transitioning government 
offices and municipal jobs to Filipino control after generations of education under 
American administrators as the first Commissioner William Howard Taft had suggested, 
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it started to occur within 10 years. By that time primary education had already come to 
focus on industrial skills rather than the ideals originally planned.  
American plans in Puerto Rico differed in that prior to the invasion a decision had 
been made to keep the island. As in the Philippines the initial plans included public 
education, but the goal differed in that Puerto Ricans would be Americanized. Unlike the 
Philippines, American capital was allowed to flow in unfettered, and it quickly resulted in 
the taking over of industries by American corporations.  A native elite also existed that 
had won concessions from the Spanish just prior to the invasion and initially offered 
resistance but came to work with the Americans once a form of self-rule was established.   
For the sake of stability in a territory that the U.S. did not intend to relinquish, the goals 
of public education were ultimately subordinated to the needs of local industries that 
needed laborers with industrial skills.  
The 1999 centennial of General Emilio Aguinaldo’s declaration of independence 
sparked celebrations throughout the Philippines. The United States, a key ally and trading 
partner, participated in the celebration of this historic event, but there is some irony since 
its actions in 1898 prevented the first serious Filipino attempt at being an independent 
nation. In 1999, the U.S. embassy created pamphlets for general distribution during the 
centennial celebrations that described and praised the generous motives behind American 
involvement in the Philippines and how its actions led to widespread improvements in the 
lives and prospects of all Filipinos. Of particular note for this study is the pamphlet, The 
American Contribution to Philippine Education 1898-19981 praising the role of America 
in creating a successful system of public education open to all Filipinos.  This thirty-nine 
                                                 
1 Greta N. Morris, The American Contribution to Philippine education: 1898-1998 (Manila: United States 
Information Service, 1998). 
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page pamphlet describes the role of American educators and administrators responsible 
for bringing liberal teaching methods to the archipelago.  These educators are credited 
with providing Filipinos with the training necessary for involvement in a democratic 
society and elected government. Through numerous photos and facts the pamphlet 
describes the experiences of Filipino students from all socioeconomic classes joined 
together in public schools. The desired impression is that students developed the ideas 
they learned in the classroom to become capable of resisting corrupt leaders. The view 
that the U.S. administration of the Philippines, including public education, benefitted 
Filipinos stuck in their less developed state continues to be the common theme. The 
popular belief is that America’s push to spread its values and republican principles in its 
first overseas imperial foray was an exceptional event that bettered its subjects. American 
teachers and education administrators won accolades for being key components in the 
transformation of Filipinos into politically aware, freethinking people capable of resisting 
the autocracy and corruption so prevalent under the Spanish. A government review done 
after twenty years of American rule in the Philippines reported less auspicious results.  
Ambitious goals set by the first American Philippine commissioners failed to 
materialize and instead efforts fell quite short. Initially, Filipinos benefited from the 
American focus upon providing free education, but as the system evolved it could not 
keep up with the demands placed upon it. The waning support of the American public 
and the volatile policies of new administrations reduced support for what it would take to 
use education to remake Philippine society. Instead, less ambitious goals led to less 
impressive results. 
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A similar evolution took place in Puerto Rico where education was also seen as 
the centerpiece of an effort to Americanize the natives.  American administrations treated 
Puerto Rico as a long term acquisition with economic and strategic importance, which led 
to an early determination to use education as a means of maintaining stability. Direct 
attempts at Americanization and teaching English encountered strong resistance. Schools 
instead became a means to supply American companies with trained laborers.  
Few comparative studies exist for U.S. administrative method or education 
policies in the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Instead the popular trend has been to isolate 
the U.S.-Philippine experience as a unique moment in the history of imperialism with any 
comparisons designed more to highlight the exceptional nature of American rule. 
Comparisons designed to accentuate the altruistic motives of America, like juxtaposing it 
with the harsh Japanese imperial systems in Taiwan or Manchuria, strengthen the weight 
of the argument supporting an exceptional situation in the Philippines but do not 
encourage a deeper examination of American rule.  Histories that counter the general 
acceptance of a generous and progressive U.S. rule started to appear in the 1970s and 
coincided with the tumult associated with Ferdinand Marcos’ declaration of martial law 
and dictatorial rule. A History of the Philippines(1976), by the late Renato Constantino, 
characterizes U.S. misrule in the Philippines and paints a portrait of an education system 
designed to pacify the lower classes and stratify the classes between the haves and have-
nots rather than breed a democratic society. However, Constantino focused upon what he 
viewed as the evils of U.S. imperialism without seeing the importance of comparing with 
the policies of other empires of the period.2 Glenn Anthony May’s Social Engineering in 
                                                 
2 Renato Constantino, A History of the Philippines: From the Spanish Colonization to the Second World 
War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976). 
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the Philippines (1980) succeeds in shedding light upon the sometimes less noble motives 
of the American government, but Glenn limits his comparison to how the population 
disparity between colony and mother country may have affected administrative strategy.3  
Stanley Karnow examines the Philippine-American relationship during and since the 
colonial experience in his Pulitzer Prize-winning In Our Image: America’s Empire in the 
Philippines (1990)4. Karnow goes to slightly greater lengths to contrast American ways 
with those of European empires while also briefly portraying U.S. rule as milder and 
more well-meaning. He does provide information and references that are vital to any 
historians interested in comparative research. The more recent, The American Colonial 
State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives (2003) is a relatively rare comparative 
history that examines and links the actions of the United States in the Philippines with 
other parts of American and European empires in Southeast Asia. 5  
 The journal entries, letters and speeches of the people responsible for directing 
U.S. policy locally reflect many points of view. Most of these men sought books and 
reports describing the administrations of European empires as examples to draw upon. 
The nature of the U.S. colonial experience, and the relatively small group of people 
familiar with colonial administration, fostered the circulation of ideas. Soldiers that 
served during the invasions later came to serve as administrators in multiple possessions 
and earned a reputation as experts in native rule. Much of the early history of public 
                                                 
3 Glenn Anthony May,  Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of 
American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913 (Contributions in Comparative Colonial Studies)  (Westport & 
London: Greenwood Press, 1980). 
4 Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines ( New York: Ballantine Books, 
1990). 
5 Julian Go and Anne L. Foster, ed., The American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). 
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education in America’s Philippines consists of romanticized accounts describing kind-
hearted teachers arriving in Manila on the steamship Thomas to teach Filipinos how to be 
civilized. Political speeches of that period and afterward extol the altruism of Americans 
who chose to serve in the Philippines despite the harsh conditions and alien culture. 
Later, as the focus of education shifted to industrial training and Filipinos took over 
teaching and administration, reports showed that the majority of students received an 
incomplete education lasting an average of three years. Meanwhile in Puerto Rico, where 
American interest grew and the administration expanded, minor increases in literacy 
levels were attained but real economic opportunity remained the domain of American 
businesses and elite Puerto Ricans for many years. The administration did not have to 
retreat from the major goal of providing education, even if it became more focused on 
vocations, because the U.S. had decided to keep the island before the first troops had 
come ashore. For the first twenty years of American rule in Puerto Rico approximately a 
third of government expenditures went towards the budget of the board of education. 
Curriculums differed from those in the Philippines in that they focused upon technical 
training and Americanization so that the economy, increasingly dominated by American 
businesses, would be provided with a trained, docile workforce.  Institutions were formed 
and staffed by people who had shown themselves to be allies of the American 
administration. Special interests played a role in shaping the policies affecting these new 
territories and their people. There were business interests in the U.S. that did not want 
Filipinos to become citizens or to allow their cheap products into America where it would 
hurt their profits. However, the strategic concerns of trade access to China and a 
modernizing Japanese empire forced the U.S. to emphasize stability rather than 
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potentially disruptive change. The initial concern that Filipinos needed to be taught how 
to be free, liberty loving citizens faded away with the transfer of power to the Filipino 
government. In the Philippines, a gradual evolution took place where American concerns 
gravitated towards stability and accommodation with elites. The public education that 
was meant to free Filipinos from corrupt leaders instead helped to stabilize the situation 
and maintain a status quo.  
 U.S. officials in the Philippines and Puerto Rico eventually came to the 
conclusion that working to convince the local elites to cooperate made their jobs easier. 
Both parties agreed that unchecked nationalism undermined their interests. Americans 
needed their subjects to be loyal or at least passive while native elites wished to ensure 
that they remained at the top of the local hierarchy. Spain had incorporated native elites 
into their administrations in the Philippines and Puerto Rico because it kept 
administration affordable but also prevented them from uniting and becoming leaders in 
agitating for freedom or fomenting unrest. The educated elite in the Philippines, the 
ilustrado, gained political power during the previous fifty years of Spanish rule, largely 
due to a willingness to work for their rulers in the vain hope that cooperation would lead 
to acceptance in Spanish circles and real sharing of power. Many even sought out roles in 
the new colonial government during and after the successful American defeat of native 
insurgent groups. Working with the Americans seemingly guaranteed the retention of 
some of the power won during the 19th century under the Spanish. Meanwhile the 
Americans came to see in the ilustrado the means to keep the Philippines passive and the 
people cooperative. Ilustrado like Pardo de Tavera, Manuel Quezon and Sergio Osmeña 
cooperated with the Americans while influencing government policy to avoid drastic 
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changes in policies that could upset their hold on Filipino politics. Both Quezon and 
Osmeña successfully navigated this period and would later serve as the first two 
presidents of the Philippine Commonwealth while in de Tavera Americans had a 
respected intellectual who supported U.S. policies until he misjudged political 
headwinds. 
 Ilustrado supported public education yet rejected it as the means through which 
lower classes could challenge them for a grip on political power. If schools provided a 
means for the lower and middle classes to attain success or influence outside of the realm 
of Filipino politics and patron-client relationships it would threaten ilustrado power. 
Initial American hopes for the success of education constituted a worst case scenario for 
the ruling elite in the Philippines if it exceeded a very limited scope a more politically 
active population might result. Instead, it was more palatable to support a public school 
system that provided minimal education while also providing Filipino and American 
politicians with evidence of their goodwill. As it turned out, a passive Filipino society 
and stable rule came to mean more to American administrators than the liberal ideal of 
spreading republican virtues and civic responsibility.  
 There are a great many government reports, debates, and records documenting the 
histories of the administrations in the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Records of discussions 
and debates help to point out why certain decisions and policies were made.  The annual 
reports of the colonial governors to the President and Congress, including the sections on 
Public Instruction Departments provide a great deal of information that is important in 
reconstructing what influenced policy. Statistics are also available to determine how far-
reaching and successful education was at any given point in time. I will incorporate the 
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research of primarily American, Filipino and Puerto Rican historians. Ideological 
influences are noted, especially in the works of a historian like Renato Constantino who 
wrote in the midst of Ferdinand Marcos’ crackdown on Marxist groups in the Philippines.  
Understanding the circumstances that compelled American colonial 
administrators to change education policy will help us understand ongoing world events 
that include concepts of nation building. Nation building in the Middle East as well as 
numerous possibilities in Africa and Asia continue to present situations where a 19th or 
20th century “colonial-style” experience might be repeated. The U.S. experience with 
imperialism began with violence but also with the promise that it differed from previous 
colonial occupations. Public statements from the major players, whether they consisted of 
politicians, bureaucrats or soldiers, stressed how they wished to improve the condition 
and prospects of the natives that they had subjugated. The fact remains that in the course 
of implementing and managing these plans, decisions were made that compromised them 
and turned them into something different. For the sake of strategic, political and 
economic considerations, education was scaled back and expectations lowered to match 
the disappointing results. For the most part, the rhetoric of the original plan remains in 
romanticized accounts. 









The United States underwent many changes in the decades leading up to the clash 
with Spain in 1898. The previous hundred years had witnessed the nation’s uneven but 
persistent development into a world power. Early in the 19th century the British Army had 
burned Washington D.C., yet fifty years later the Union military ranked among those of 
the European powers. Reductions in the post-Civil War military proved temporary, and 
near the end of the century a push to modernize and increase military capabilities ensued. 
It was in the midst of this period tension between the U.S. and imperial Spain escalated to 
dangerous levels. 
The economic growth that eventually fueled increases in military potential came 
from the conquest of North America. Throughout the century population growth and 
movement had expanded the nation’s borders west to the Pacific and South to the Rio 
Grande. Indian tribes and later Mexico could not stop the relentless push of an American 
culture that increasingly viewed domination of the continent as a destiny ordained by 
God.  Disregarding the history of Indian land use as the workings of primitives, 
Americans looked upon a pristine wilderness that required their industry. The steady 
reduction in the range available to Indians and epidemic disease brought from Europe 
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increased the stresses on their societies. American policies placed Indians in a position 
where they became dependent on their enemies for survival. Historian Richard White 
provides an example of this in the plight of the Choctaw in attempting to resist American 
force during the first half of the 19th century. The growing strength of the United States 
and its willingness to take advantage of divisions in Indian society led to total Choctaw 
submission.  A story commentators repeated many times as the United States took shape.6   
What would come to be called “manifest destiny” inspired American settlers, 
capitalists, missionaries, and soldiers to stream over the continent. Claims were made on 
land Indians had used for centuries that Whites judged to be wasted or misused. 
Reservations set up on the least desirable land, at least for the moment, became the new 
smaller ranges for Indians. The trespassing of settlers and miners continued unabated as 
did the constant pushing of Indians off of the land desired by Whites. Resistance became 
increasingly futile as local White populations increased and Indian societies shrunk from 
disease, starvation and assimilation. 
 Expansion across North America required the United States to formulate policies 
that combined violence with compassion. The outcome of Indian wars, and in some cases 
American peace, sometimes resembled genocide, but publicly American policy 
incorporated a responsibility to “civilize” Indians. Though most Americans viewed 
Indians as savages, they also saw it as their responsibility to teach Indians how to live in a 
civilized fashion. Efforts to “uplift” Indians included forcing them to develop European 
male-centered hierarchies, become agrarian, and send their children to Anglo schools. 
Boarding schools took Indian children far from their homes to get them away from 
                                                 
6 Richard White, The Roots of Dependency (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press: 1983), 
113-122. 
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influences that could cause backsliding. Educated youth could return to their tribes where 
it was hoped they would become leaders and increasingly do away with inferior Indian 
cultural practices. Efforts to curb native practices included frequent restrictions on Indian 
religious and social ceremonies on reservations. Agents also attempted to break down 
Indian communities by forcing the allotment of land over communal property and the 
provision of White teachers to instruct Indians in farming. The goal was to transform 
Indian men into yeoman farmers with a sense of personal industry. As the government 
worked to create loyal American Indians, missionary churches set up shop in and near 
reservations across the nation. Protestant and Catholic clergy introduced their one and 
true god to Indians in an effort to save their souls and at the same time destroy native 
spiritual and social beliefs.7  
 Conquest of the West took a relatively short amount of time to accomplish. The 
results of the 1890 U.S. Census showed that there was such a sharp reduction in unsettled 
areas that the Superintendent of the Census, Robert P. Porter, in an 1891 Special Bulletin, 
surmised that a frontier no longer existed.8 There were still Indians, reservations, and 
open lands but the conquest of the West driven by ideas of manifest destiny had been 
almost completely successful. This period also saw an increase in the American desire to 
display its power outside of U.S. borders. It is during the late 19th century that modern 
war colleges started to take shape and the theories of men like Alfred T. Mahan, who 
called for a strong and modern navy, became popular with politicians. As the initial 
American experience overseas in places like the Philippines and Puerto Rico would 
                                                 
7 Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of the Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New 
York:Alfred A. Knopf, 2012), 135-140. 
8 U.S. Department of the Interior, Extra Census Bulletin, (Washington, D.C., 1891), 3-4. 
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show, Americans still had a strong urge to spread their democratic ideals and educate the 
“lesser” people they conquered. The acquisition of these two countries, but the 
Philippines in particular, eventually strained this belief and forced a reassessment of the 
original American policy.     
 
 









Prior to the first shots of the Spanish-American War in 1898, the U.S. planned the 
invasion of Spain’s colonies, but it was rushed and turned out to be inadequate. The 
Federal government lacked the resources, in the form of experienced people and 
appropriate departments, to plan and consider the conquest and long-term occupation of 
overseas territories. American overseas experience was also limited. It is rumored, 
although it may be an apocryphal story that after reports came in of the victory of 
Commodore Dewey’s fleet over the Spanish President McKinley could not find the 
Philippines, let alone Manila Bay, on a globe.9 The United States had no comparable 
colonial departments like those in Britain and France that produced officials that 
managed far larger native populations in Asia and around the world. From a military 
perspective, an overseas campaign appeared farfetched based upon current capabilities. 
The U.S. Army, which would have to handle most of the fighting, had not been involved 
in a major conflict for over thirty years, since the end of the Civil War. Despite lacking 
the experience or many of the tools necessary for overseas expansion, many Americans 
did support making the leap and, in effect, expanding manifest destiny beyond America’s 
                                                 
9 Stuart Creighton Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903 ( 
New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1984), 13.  
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borders. The President, congressmen and commentators spoke with conviction about 
defeating the Spanish Empire and enlightening the simple natives in its former colonies. 
Certainly the rapid success of the nation’s westward expansion over the course of the 
19th century had helped to foster these initial steps toward overseas imperialism. 
Regardless of these glaring shortcomings, the administration of President William 
McKinley cobbled together plans for war taking ideas from various sources. The army 
still had a cadre of officers with Civil War experience to lead its troops. The limited-term 
volunteer soldiers, making up the majority of the initial troops, did not match regular 
army troops in terms of training or obedience; yet , they started the campaign with 
enthusiasm. The shortcomings of U.S. forces paled in comparison to those of Spain, 
where problems with equipment, morale and training proved insurmountable.  
The Cuban revolution against Spain and the strategies that Madrid used to 
maintain control compelled the U.S. to slowly become more involved. Spanish tactics 
involving the forced removal of civilians, leading to deaths typical in war, and the reach 
of newspapers helped to dramatize the horrors of war to a larger audience than ever 
before. Newspaper publishers, key among them William Randolph Hearst, took horrific 
stories and made them even more lurid in order to sell papers. Playing up the threats and 
assaults on Americans in Cuba added to a growing American hatred for evil and corrupt 
Spaniards.10 President McKinley’s protests and Spain’s failure to subdue insurgent forces 
kept the suffering in the news. In 1897 McKinley, likely urged by public opinion and 
Congress, sent a diplomatic message to Madrid indicating that the situation in Cuba 
would eventually lead to the U.S. having to make important decisions. His sending the 
                                                 
10 Evan Thomas, The War Lovers: Roosevelt, Lodge, Hearst, and the Rush to Empire, 1898 (New York: 
Little Brown and Co., 2010), 190-198. 
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battleship Maine to Havana and its subsequent destruction by an explosion in February 
1898 ultimately precipitated the Spanish-American War. Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 
Theodore Roosevelt, helped to draw the Philippines into the battle plan by issuing 
instructions to Commodore Dewey’s squadron to sail for Manila once war was declared. 
11 
Elihu Root, the Secretary of War, was assigned the task of putting together a 
coherent strategy for the conquest and rule of Spain’s colonies. Root was a corporate 
lawyer prior to joining the administration and his search for ideas included collecting the 
latest books and reports on the British and French empires, but he eventually decided that 
their systems would clash with an American style of rule. Ironically, he supported a 
policy of incorporating American principles of government into what would become the 
nation’s first colonial possession.  The policies that the War Department ultimately 
followed had to be changed and eventually bordered on improvisation since the U.S. 
Congress lacked the experience of colonial rule to govern the nation’s newest possession 
in the Philippines. Though Root saw the necessity of infusing colonial rule with 
American principles of freedom, he considered improving the conditions of the lowest 
Filipino classes at the expense of the local elite as a goal of U.S. administration. Root, a 
conservative, was wary of destabilizing Filipino society while it was under American 
rule. 12  
                                                 
11 David J. Silbey, A War of Frontier and Empire: The Philippine-American War, 1899-1902 (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 2007), 32-36. 
12 Glenn Anthony May,  Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of 
American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913 (Contributions in Comparative Colonial Studies), (Westport & 
London: Greenwood Press, 1980), 3-8.  
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Prior to the arrival of U.S. forces in Manila Bay, a Filipino nationalist army had 
been on the verge of overpowering the forces of their beleaguered Spanish masters. For 
nearly half a millennia Spain, from its base in Manila, had exerted control over most of 
the Philippine archipelago either directly or through co-opted native leaders. The Muslim 
Moros of the southern archipelago eluded their direct control. Up to 1898 Filipino society 
had become stratified under Spanish rule, with Spaniards, of course, at the top and 
holding all the privileges of being imperial rulers. The Catholic Church shared power 
with the Spanish government, especially in the countryside where Spanish control was 
decidedly weaker than in urban areas. Below them were the local leaders –principalía- 
which the Spanish entrusted with governing rural towns and small villages. The newest 
class of urban elites, the ilustrado, came from wealthy families and attained their own 
separate status by receiving private schooling in the Philippines or if they were from 
families of greater means, in Europe. Below these groups were the vast majority of 
uneducated farmers and laborers that often worked under local leaders and on the 
extensive estates belonging to the Catholic Church.  
The principalía developed out of the local chiefs from rural areas that had cast 
their lot with the Spanish conquerors. So long as these chiefs acted as extensions of 
Spanish imperial will, they would retain their status and receive gifts. Over the many 
years of Spanish rule this class developed and incorporated new people, through 
intermarriage with Spaniards and Chinese mestizos, into strong patronage networks 
across regions and towns. Money, favors and promises solidified relationships and 
created bonds between principale families and peasants. These connections made the 
principalía important to the groups to which they pledged their allegiance. They would 
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benefit from the reduction in Spanish and Church oversight that a successful revolution 
would bring.13 
The ilustrados owed their existence to reforms that the Spanish enacted in the 
mid-19th century. Trade restrictions were lifted, and Filipinos could engage in more 
external trade which gave rise to some very affluent families. Ilustrado were very often 
mestizo and came from urban areas. The Education Decree of 1863 reformed the school 
system in the Philippines ostensibly for the benefit of the masses, but in reality only the 
wealthy could afford to do without the work of their children and send them to state run 
schools. Families that had engaged in the export trade sent their sons to private schools in 
the cities or Spain. These men eventually became business leaders and occupied the 
relatively few government positions that Spain allowed to Filipinos. A successful 
revolution against Spain would have thrown open central government offices to the 
educated ilustrado and removed any remaining Spanish-imposed restrictions on their 
upward mobility and business activities.14 Ilustrado overtures toward the invading 
Americans, at the same time they claimed to support Aguinaldo, helped to fatally weaken 
the Filipino revolution. However, it also left the American administrators in a position 
that they had not been in recently and that was dealing with a class of native elites that 
was wealthy and as educated, or more so in some cases, than they were. 
Puerto Rico did not undergo the same violent rebellion against Spain that ripped 
apart the Philippines and Cuba prior to U.S. involvement. During the course of the 19th 
                                                 
13 Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past Revisted, Vol. 1 (Quezon City: Tala Publishing Services, 
1975), 141-142. 
14 John M. Gates, Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army in the Philippines, 1898-1902 
(Contributions in Military Studies) (Westport & London: Greenwood Press Inc., 1973), 10-12. 
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century, Spain instituted a gradual reform that allowed their Puerto Rican born subjects to 
participate in rule. Puerto Ricans could gain offices and achieve low levels of government 
involvement, as would happen in the Philippines, and in the same fashion this reform did 
not occur quickly enough to satisfy the native elite. Power remained centralized with a 
governor selected and sent from Madrid, and his appointees. Popular political movements 
developed and challenged one another as they also argued for the loosening of central 
control from Spain. Unlike the Philippines, a successful rebellion did not develop prior to 
the invasion of U.S. forces. 
Leading up to the U.S. invasion two political parties vied for power in Puerto 
Rico. The Autonomists, led by Luis Munoz Rivera, mainly represented the interests of 
the creole members of the economic and intellectual elite - planters, small merchants and 
professionals. Rivera and the Autonomists sought peaceful reforms that would loosen 
colonial trade restrictions and allow some self-rule while remaining within the Spanish 
orbit. Arrayed against the Autonomists were the Spanish-born merchants, peninsulares, 
of the Unconditional Party that controlled most of the commerce and held many of the 
mortgages taken out by island businessmen. The Unconditional Party called for full 
annexation by Spain. Late in 1897, the Autonomists won concessions from Spain that 
established a limited form of self-rule. The first meeting of the new Parliament 
established by these concessions met a month before the United States invaded and 
quashed any realistic hope for Puerto Rico’s independence.15 
The history of education in Puerto Rico followed a similar path to that of the 
Philippines with many reforms occurring during the 19th century. Catholic schools 
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provided the only source of education for the first several hundred years of Spanish rule. 
Reading and writing were taught around a central curriculum based on Catholic 
teachings, with education goals matching the religious goals of the Church. Enactment of 
a plan to provide a better-rounded education only occurred in the mid-19th century when 
Spanish reforms divided Puerto Rico into districts assigned to individual teachers. 
According to records the reforms proved insufficient, and success outside of the San Juan 
district remained noticeably absent. An 1865 Royal Decree16 offered public instruction 
for free to those that could not afford it, and also made it compulsory. However, most of 
the students benefitting from this decree came from the wealthier strata of Puerto Rican 
society, while the children from rural areas and lower economic classes generally did not 
benefit.17 This is the state of education that Americans found when they invaded. 
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EDUCATION POLICIES OF THE U.S. MILITARY 
 
 
 Units of the U.S. Army began to arrive off of Manila in June 1898 to follow up 
Admiral George Dewey’s defeat of the Spanish fleet. The slow, steady build-up of 
American troops and the increasingly sporadic communication that Filipino General 
Emilio Aguinaldo had with American leaders left him suspicious about their ultimate 
intentions in the Philippines. General T.M. Anderson, the first army commander to arrive, 
apparently reassured General Aguinaldo that the United States held no ulterior motives, 
similar to what Dewey had said to him. However, once General Wesley Merritt, the 
overall commander of the operation, arrived, he ordered all communications with 
Aguinaldo to cease.18 Tense suspicion overcame both armies as they guarded the 
besieged Spanish outside the walls of Manila.  
 President McKinley’s instructions to his army commanders and those from 
various members of his administration indicated that plans for the Philippines after 
Spain’s defeat remained undecided. In fact, Merritt had left Washington and a meeting 
with the President without receiving clear instructions aside from the objective of keeping 
the peace while peace negotiations with the Spanish proceeded. In August 1898 the 
maneuvering of Aguinaldo’s forces along the Manila line conflicted with Merrill’s line
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and he wired Washington D.C. for instructions. The instructions he received from the 
President remained vague, and confined him to keeping the peace. At this point only 
Spain stood as the sole enemy when another wire arrived, instructing him to pursue 
actions necessary to prevent Filipinos from taking the city, but then in a separate telegram 
he was instructed to do all he could to “preserve the peace”.19 To ensure the capture of 
Manila remained an exclusively American affair, a partially choreographed battle, meant 
to limit casualties, was arranged with the Spanish governor commanding the city 
garrison.  Merritt took this opportunity to plan the occupation of Manila so that his forces 
would enter the city ahead of Aguinaldo’s forces.20 The “battle” went as planned, but it 
initiated a stalemate with Aguinaldo’s forces holding positions outside of central Manila 
that lasted for months pending the outcome of peace negotiations. 
 The American forces occupying Manila found that municipal services had 
stopped during the siege, and civilians lived in miserable conditions. Many people had 
escaped the city, and many services typically taken for granted, such as sanitation, 
policing and the delivery of fresh water, had fallen apart. The U.S. Army in Manila 
possessed training well beyond that necessary for combat. It contained many men that 
could help in this worsening situation with more than 75% of the army then in the 
Philippines consisting of volunteers only a few months removed from the work they had 
been doing in their civilian lives. Among both officers and men were lawyers, merchants, 
students and tradesmen who had various skills that could be put to work in restoring 
some services to the city. Many of these men came from American urban centers and 
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were familiar with the progressive reforms enacted to improve conditions for city 
residents.21 While the stalemate with Aguinaldo’s surrounding forces continued, soldiers 
with civilian training could be used to bring basic services back on line.  
 One mission that McKinley had made clear to Merritt was that Filipinos should be 
made to know that American intentions were beneficent. This mission was 
enthusiastically acted upon, and many soldiers with their civilian life experience were set 
to win over Filipinos. Once Merritt’s forces had control of Manila, he used his troops as a 
police force to enforce curfews, restore fire and water services, and respect Filipino 
customs as practically as he could.22 One of the first public institutions that he restored 
within the city was the school system in September of 1898. Merritt gave responsibility 
for the city schools to Father W.D. McKinnon, a chaplain of the 1st California Volunteers. 
McKinnon had to repair many damaged buildings and rent out space in order to open 
thirty-nine schools in the month after the occupation of Manila. Soldiers were enlisted as 
teachers to replace the shortage of teachers remaining in the city. Despite shortages of 
supplies, space, and teachers, the initial curriculum included English, and for the first 
time Manila had secular public education.23  
 Schools reopened during the occupation of Manila by American troops. General 
Elwell Otis, who replaced General Merritt as commander of forces in Manila after he left 
for peace negotiations in Paris, is credited with helping to accustom Filipinos to an 
American presence that was not based solely on the threat of violence. Otis, a Harvard 
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Law School graduate, was highly regarded as an administrator but not as a combat 
officer. He instead freely released soldiers to teach primary school classes in English. As 
the war moved into the countryside surrounding Manila, this practice appeared in the 
small village schools that dotted the rural areas.24 Through these actions he closely 
followed the instructions that President McKinley wired him in January 1899, shortly 
before the opening of hostilities with Aguinaldo’s forces, to “improve the condition of the 
inhabitants, securing the peace, liberty, and the pursuit of their highest good.” McKinley 
hoped that if insurgent Filipinos realized that they would benefit from cooperating with 
the U.S. bloodshed could be avoided.25 From the perspective of the army it also made 
sense to provide for the wants and needs of the native population in order to maximize 
goodwill and reduce the number of people that could become potential recruits and 
supporters of Emilio Aguinaldo’s Katipunan.  
 The war between Filipino nationalists and American forces started in February of 
1899. Once war began, it is debatable whether American officers took President 
McKinley’s instructions to use “tact and kindness”26 to heart but at the time they needed 
some strategy to separate civilians willing to remain passive from those that supported 
the forces of Aguinaldo. Civic improvements like free public schools, even if they 
initially provided very limited curriculums, could foster the goodwill that the Katipunan 
would find hard to duplicate while under pressure from U.S. Army troops.  
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General Otis realized the importance of using his forces to perform other missions 
aside from pushing back Aguinaldo. American troops continued to work at bettering the 
living situation of the average Filipino civilians in Otis’ expanding area of control.  Otis 
took an interest in the details of the school system that his army had been called upon to 
support and dedicated resources to providing soldiers and supplies. Much of the effort did 
result in an improvised education system, especially in the more rural areas, but Otis 
believed that displaying American largesse in a time of war remained important.27 The 
public relations face of this strategy, which may have differed at least initially from the 
army’s intent, manifest in statement by an American journalist, H. Phelps Whitmarsh, in 
December 1899: 
They feel now, for the first time, that they are being helped. At no very 
distant date, I hope, when the suspicious nature of these people is satisfied, 
the work being done in the schools here will have its effect. It will then be 
one of the most potent forces in bringing about a reconciliation, and go far 
toward convincing the natives that American sovereignty means 
enlightenment, progress, civilization, and the fullest measure of 
independence consistent with their safety and well-being.28  
A year later Whitmarsh would become the first civilian provincial governor appointed by 
the Commission.  
The arrival of the first Philippine Commission in March 1899, headed by Jacob G. 
Schurman,29 brought the first official civilian attention to the needs of America’s newest 
territory. At the time Schurman served as president of Cornell University. The 
Commission completed its work in September without ever having gone outside the 
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vicinity of Manila, nor did it interview a sampling of Filipinos from different 
backgrounds. Instead many of the interviews came from ilustrados that had approached 
the Americans and offered to help in the transition of power.30 Though the needs of all 
Filipinos were to be examined, the list of those who went before the Commission 
consisted largely of educated men from wealthy backgrounds representing banking, 
railroads, shipping and the legal profession.31 Later some of these interviewees became 
part of the colonial government and legislature. The following year the Commission 
published its findings based partly on the interviews and included, among their other 
points, a recommendation that free public education be provided to all Filipinos.  
 The U.S. Army relentlessly advanced across the Philippines and as it went 
assigned soldiers to set up impromptu schooling, in the process helping to win the hearts 
and minds of Filipino townspeople. While the army brought more towns under formal 
control, the Schurman Commission conducted its Philippine survey in and around 
Manila. The task of providing schools faced daunting challenges with books, teachers and 
buildings in short supply. Fierce fighting continued as U.S. troops pushed out into the 
countryside. Dedicated funding for education materialized only when the reorganization 
of municipal governments under American guidance transpired. In an effort to focus 
resources, and direct them where they could be most beneficial, the army created the 
Department of Public Instruction commanded by Captain Albert Todd in March 1900. To 
his and the army’s credit, within 5 months 100,000 pupils had been enrolled in 
approximately 1,000 schools. The army also shipped in and distributed $100,000 in 
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school supplies and textbooks. Captain Todd used the suggestions of soldiers teaching in 
the field to create a plan for compulsory primary education that other officers supported 
partly because it offered a less destructive means of pacifying the more desolate areas of 
the Philippines. Field notes from officers indicate that Filipinos generally appreciated a 
program that attempted to provide any education at all while the war continued.32 The 
Spanish public education system, established primarily for the lower classes and heavily 
influenced by the Catholic clergy, had resulted in basic literacy rates (in Spanish) of 2% 
and left the country with fewer than 2,000 teachers of all skill levels, or approximately 1 
teacher per 3,500 inhabitants. This meant that directing a modest amount of aid to 
education could go a long way. The U.S. Army and, later, the civilian government, 
initially found itself in a situation where they could improve the situation significantly 
through the use of a relatively small number of people and limited funds.33 Once the war 
ended and formal education plans were implemented, the needs of the schools would 
quickly outstrip the resources.  
 General Otis had excellent training in administration and knew that he needed to 
reestablish the Filipino municipal governments, rule of law and financing streams. The 
army could sustain services only for a limited time, which made funding and budgets 
paramount.  In January, 1900 Otis established a board containing three of his officers and 
two Filipino ilustrado, Cayetano Arellano and Florentino Torres. The war against 
Aguinaldo’s nationalist army continued, and the Army required a plan to manage the 
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towns falling under its control. The board members, representing a mix of American 
officers, focused on keeping public order in the middle of a war, and ilustrados with their 
own concerns for preserving the Filipino social order never recommended drastic 
changes to the system that existed under Spain. Instead they agreed to maintain existing 
structures of municipal government and to create a very small electorate invariably voting 
for principalía and ilustrado leaders.34 Despite sporadic eruptions of friction between 
Americans on one side and Filipino leaders of ilustrado and principalía backgrounds on 
the other, many of the decisions made during this period demonstrate that relations 
between the groups functioned well and that stability became an increasingly overriding 
concern.   
 The strategy of aiding Filipino municipalities while fighting a war against 
Aguinaldo worked to split the Katipunan from its civilian support. Increasingly, towns 
refused to offer aid to Aguinaldo, and ilustrado officers left to work with the Americans. 
General Aguinaldo was forced to split his forces and attempt a guerilla war which 
increased the violence and destruction. Aguinaldo’s leadership came to an ignominious 
end as he was captured on March 23, 1901 by a special team of U.S. soldiers and Filipino 
scouts who had tracked him to his mountain base. The following month he took an oath 
of allegiance to the United States. The guerilla war officially continued for another year 
before being declared over in July 1902.35  
 What became known as the Philippine Insurrection had lasting effects on how the 
American public and officials viewed the Philippines. Americans initially believed that 
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Filipinos would welcome them as saviors.  Instead, stories flowed back to the U.S. about 
the horrors of what became a guerilla war involving ambushes, the destruction of towns 
and torture of prisoners. The war cast a shadow upon the whole enterprise and shaped 
policies that limited the duration and extent of U.S. rule in the Philippines. 
 A strategic interest in Puerto Rico developed slowly within the political and 
military circles of Washington D.C. during the 1890’s. Economic, demographic and 
political shifts pointed in the direction of an increasing American interest in exerting 
power beyond its borders. The theories and writings of U.S. Navy officer Alfred T. 
Mahan are significant in indicating how strategic thinking evolved and showing how 
overseas bases became important for a nation with many trade routes and interests to 
protect. Overseas bases provided the means to exert power far from the mother country, 
and as a side benefit could also provide new markets. However, even Mahan initially 
thought that Cuba would be of more consequence than Puerto Rico in his testimony to 
Congress before the war.36 But thinking in strategic terms, taking Puerto Rico was a wise 
move to cut off any Spanish relief forces from using the naval facilities on the island, 
which would in turn be useful to U.S. forces. This plan, originally viewed as a temporary 
measure, instead found advocates who favored keeping the island and the bases for an 
indeterminate length. Letters and telegrams from U.S. leaders confirm that a more 
permanent U.S. presence was desired. Two months prior to the invasion, Theodore 
Roosevelt wrote the following to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge:  
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I earnestly hope that no truce will be granted and that peace will only be 
made on consideration of Cuba being independent, Porto Rico ours, and 
the Philippines taken away from Spain.37 
Roosevelt’s stance is reflected in a note from President McKinley to John Hay, 
the U.S. ambassador to Great Britain, about a month prior to the invasion in 
which he insisted that the cession of Puerto Rico would be required in any peace 
negotiations with Spain and that money would not be accepted in its place. 38 
Economic and strategic reasons would be found and used to strengthen the 
arguments for keeping Puerto Rico, but it is clear that U.S. leaders increasingly 
viewed the occupation of Puerto Rico as very long term the closer they came to 
the launching of the military operation. 
 The conquest of Puerto Rico was distinct from military operations in the 
Philippines in being brief and having relatively few casualties. Unlike the 
Philippines there was no nationalist army or armed insurrection in progress 
against the Spanish. The area around the chosen place of disembarkation, the port 
of Guánica, housed many creole elites who were against Spanish rule. Once U.S. 
troops landed, it took only nineteen days to complete the campaign with the help 
of Puerto Ricans taking an active role in providing information and scouting 
services. 39 Local leaders, especially the Autonomists, initially welcomed the U.S. 
because they believed, based upon their knowledge of American ideals, that they 
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would get a form of rule which would allow them to get back on the trajectory 
leading to self-rule that they had been on under the Spanish. Even leaders among 
Puerto Rican laborers saw hope in being conquered by a country with advanced 
labor laws.40 The statements of General Nelson A. Miles convinced leaders like 
Luis Munoz Rivera that short-lived occupation would ensue and quickly lead to 
Puerto Rican self-rule within an American empire. 41 General Nelson A. Miles 
proclamation reinforced the idea of the invasion as a liberation:  
They  bring  you  the  fostering  arms  of  a  free  people,  whose  
greatest power  is  justice  and humanity  to all living  within  their  fold.  
Hence they  release  you  from  your  former  political  relations,  and  it  is  
hoped  this will  be  followed  by  the  cheerful  acceptance  of  the  
government  of  the United  States. 
The  chief  object  of  the  American  military  forces  will  be  to  
overthrow the  armed  authority  of  Spain and give  the  people  of  your  
beautiful island  the  largest  measure  of  liberty  consistent  with  this  
military  occupation.42 
The military campaign lasted nineteen days inflicting few casualties and less ill-
will on the opposing sides in comparison to the outcome in the Philippines after 
the extended period of warfare.  
  Rule in Puerto Rico quickly transitioned from the Spanish to a succession 
of U.S. Army generals that exercised nearly unilateral power over the new 
territory. Providing education figured prominently in military and later civilian 
plans as a key means of transforming young Puerto Ricans into law-abiding 
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subjects, if not yet duplicates of American citizens. Major John R. Brooke, the 
first military governor installed on October 18, 1898, abolished the legislature and 
distributed its responsibilities to departments headed by his appointees. Rivera 
and other Puerto Rican leaders were coopted to create a Council of Secretaries to 
assist in rule under Brooke’s administration. A more coherent education strategy 
had to wait for the term of Major General Guy V. Henry, who in, January 1899, 
brought in General John Eaton to head the Department of Education. Eaton was 
experienced and had been the U.S. Commissioner of Education at the Bureau of 
Education in 1870. Similar to the strategy in the Philippines, one of his first 
moves was to direct that English become the centerpiece of an education process 
focused upon the Americanization of Puerto Ricans. Furthering this directive, he 
appointed sixteen supervisors of American or British backgrounds to oversee the 
rollout process in the school districts.43 Education policies that stressed the 
teaching of English followed in step with the views of Secretary of War Elihu 
Root who believed that literacy, along with property ownership, were 
preconditions for allowing Puerto Ricans to vote. Root also saw literacy as a 
means to eliminate what he viewed as the institutionalized corruption left behind 
by years of Spanish rule.44 The following statement issued from the Insular 
Commission that President McKinley sent to Puerto Rico in 1899 was in keeping 
with the opinions of Secretary Root: 
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 [Public education] will be more effectual in unifying the people, 
Americanizing the island , preparing them to be acquainted with our laws, 
customs and literature, and hastening the day when Spanish influence will 
be thrown off, illiteracy banished, and the people become fully qualified to 
exercise the full duties of American citizenship than all other 
recommendations proposed, with the children speaking the English 
language and the young people reading American books and using the 
American tongue all will strive to obtain and education to become full 
Americans.45  
 Spanish rule had left Puerto Rico and its latest rulers with an existing education 
infrastructure. Before the U.S. invasion there were 380 schools for boys and 138 schools 
for girls along with a school for adults and over 20 private schools on the island. Two 
normal schools also trained new teachers. Total enrollment was reported to be 44,861 in 
1898 with about half actually in attendance on average. Urban centers received much of 
the benefit of access to schools; yet, generally many children failed to receive public 
education. The U.S. military began to build upon this system and expand it after they had 
total control of the island.46 
Shortly after the establishment of a Bureau of Education headed by Eaton, U.S. 
officials announced new laws. On May 1, 1899, the first of these established the structure 
and responsibilities of the American education system in Puerto Rico. The law required 
school boards responsible for providing all school buildings and the hiring and boarding 
of teachers to set aside a separate budget to fund the operations of the schools in their 
district. Teachers had to learn English as a precondition for employment.47 This began the 
long tug of war over the requirement to learn English in Puerto Rican schools.  
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 The requirement that English be taught as the primary medium of instruction was 
the source of endless friction for army generals and later for civilian governors, once the 
government transitioned to civilian rule after April 30, 1900. Resistance to the new laws 
revealed itself in the lackluster response of school boards and municipalities in hiring 
teachers and building schools. In October 1899 Eaton created a new Board of Education 
headed by his assistant and eventual replacement, Dr. Victor S. Clark. The Board was 
given the power to intercede when local boards failed to perform their duties to hire, or 
fire, teachers. The Board could also use its power to authorize new school buildings over 
local board procrastination. This presaged moves made in 1901, by then Commissioner 
Martin Brumbaugh, to centralize most control over staffing and school building within 
the Board of Education.48 
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PUBLIC EDUCATION UNDER INSULAR GOVERNMENT 
 
 
 The arrival of the Second Philippine Commission in June of 1900 inaugurated the 
start of civilian control over the Filipino people and the country’s schools. Headed by 
William Howard Taft49 and armed with the recommendations from the earlier 
commission under Jacob Schurman, it faced a considerable workload.  Surprisingly, they 
had received very specific guidance from President McKinley, in stark contrast to the 
vague orders he provided to his generals:  
It will be the duty of the Commission to promote and extend, and, as it 
finds occasion, to improve, the system of instruction already inaugurated 
by the military authorities. In doing this it should regard as of first 
importance the extension of a system of primary education which shall be 
free for all, and which shall tend to fit the people for duties of citizenship 
and for the ordinary avocations of a civilized community.50 
Secretary of War Elihu Root had advocated very similarly that America’s role was noble 
in his annual report to the President in 1899:  
…and that it is our unquestioning duty to make the interests of the people 
over whom we assert sovereignty the first and controlling consideration in 
all legislation and administration which concerns them, and to give them, 
to the greatest possible extent, individual freedom, self-government in 
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accordance with their capacity, just and equal laws, and an opportunity for 
education, for profitable industry, and for the development of 
civilization.51 
Despite the resistance of Governor-General Arthur MacArthur, the military and 
civilian authority in the Philippines since May, Taft and his commission took over control 
of civilian affairs and the management of the education system in the Philippines 
according to schedule on September 1, 1900. Taft appointed Harvard graduate, Fred 
Atkinson, as the first director of education. Compulsory education for all had been the 
original intent of the Commission, but stark financial conditions then and throughout the 
period precluded such an ambitious plan. 52 Army established schools continued to be the 
only realistic means of getting schools open and operating across the country as the war 
with Aguinaldo’s nationalists continued. Schools remained a symbol of American 
beneficence to Filipinos torn between supporting their insurgent brothers and sisters or 
falling into line under their new imperial government. As late as June 26, 1901 General 
Arthur MacArthur was still sending telegrams urging the prompt delivery of school 
supplies sitting on a wharf in San Francisco.53  The Taft Commission conducted its own 
research into the needs of the Philippines with member Bernard Moses made responsible 
for surveying education in the country. The tendency of American commissions, and in 
this case Moses, to confer with men from ilustrado backgrounds continued as did their 
assessment of the condition of Filipino peasants as stated by Taft:  
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They need the training of fifty or a hundred years before they shall even 
realize what Anglo-Saxon liberty is.54 
As the Commission took charge of the civil government, it also took over the 
responsibilities of a legislature with the ability to create and pass its own laws. A move 
meant to lend some validity to their actions, the Commission brought three Filipinos into 
its ranks, Pardo De Tavera, Cayetano Arellano and Victorino Mapa all from wealthy 
backgrounds. The Commission chose these men for their local expertise  and to 
demonstrate to benevolence of home rule. 55 
 Once the Americans arrived, and seemed very intent on staying, many Filipinos, 
elites and lower classes alike, reevaluated their loyalties to Aguinaldo and the cause of 
independence. Most ilustrados agreed with the goals of an independent Philippines where 
they would be able to fill the government offices vacated by the Spanish. The weight of 
arms America brought to bear against their army and the signals transmitted by Generals 
Merritt, Otis and later the Schurman and Taft Commissions forced them to reevaluate 
how they could achieve independence and more importantly how to retain the inroads 
into government that they had made under the Spanish. Initially, many came to the 
conclusion that General Aguinaldo would be defeated by the Americans and that 
switching sides presented the best chance for retaining their status and property. Pardo De 
Tavera represented a wealthy ilustrado who made the decision to cast his lot with the 
Americans very soon after their arrival.  
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However, many Filipino leaders remained with the nationalists, hoping that their 
cause would gain momentum against the U.S. They also remained aware of anti-
imperialist politics in America and hoped that elections might work in their favor. 
However, the defeat of Democratic presidential candidate William Jennings Bryant and 
his anti-imperialist platform by incumbent William McKinley dashed any hopes for an 
anti-imperialist administration in Washington and caused one of the first large spikes in 
the surrender of Filipino nationalists. The capture of Emilio Aguinaldo in 1901 and the 
passage of municipal and provincial government acts by the Taft Commission signaled to 
many Filipino ilustrados and principales that the time had come to surrender and seek out 
ways to work with or at least influence the new American administration. Taft’s 
sanctioning of the formation of the Federalistas, a political party that De Tavera initially 
headed, and developments pointing towards the establishment of a Filipino legislature 
provided the incentive for many former revolutionary patriots to make the switch and 
cooperate with America. 56  
For their part American officials like Taft and Schurman initially viewed the 
Filipino political elite as too heavily influenced by the Spanish and most likely corrupt. 
But they welcomed the opportunity to “teach” them the correct, and American, way to 
run the Philippines. While they looked down at Filipinos as primitives, they also sought 
out the advice and cooperation of men like De Tavera, Arellano and later Manuel Quezon 
because as educated men with status their opinions held some weight in the Philippines. 
Despite the poor opinion they earned from their American administrators, most ilustrados 
had received their training in private schools in the Philippines and Europe. Their 
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education in many cases was on a par with or exceeded the education that many 
Americans in the Philippine administration had received.57  
 The capture of Aguinaldo on March 23, 1901 did not immediately quell the 
nationalist insurgency of the Katipunan. American officials held no fear of losing the war 
on the battlefield; yet, they did concern themselves with winning the hearts and minds of 
Filipinos while American officers led their troops in vicious campaigns against anyone 
supporting the Katipunan.  The year 1901 saw the U.S. Army implement a 
reconcentration strategy in the central parts of the archipelago in retaliation for a 
successful nationalist ambush that killed almost half of a company of soldiers on the 
island of Samar. Reconcentration involved the wholesale, forced movement of Filipino 
towns and villages to concentration camps with nothing left behind that could aid the 
Katipunan. Public education was an important benefit that Taft and his administration 
could dangle in front of Filipinos that remained undecided in where to place their 
loyalties.58 The violence, destruction and cost of a messy war had already detracted from 
what many American officials thought would be a short military campaign. 
Civilian control over Puerto Rico benefited from the peace instilled by its quick 
and complete military conquest. However, the purpose of education and the methods it 
used to bring about an Americanization of Puerto Ricans quickly became apparent to 
local leaders. The focus on teaching in English became a lightning rod issue for 
opponents of surrendering Puerto Rican culture. Puerto Rican legislators and the 
newspapers that represented the voice of their political parties railed against education 
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policies that they viewed as attacks on their culture.  Whenever there appeared to be 
growing popular resistance to a particular policy, U.S. officials would appease local 
sentiments in order to avoid serious discontent, but Puerto Ricans were never in a 
plausible position to provide overwhelming resistance to American rule. From 1900 to 
1917, Commissioners of education continued to stress, with limited success, the need for 
English to be used in the classroom. Patriotic “exercises” remained a continuous part of 
education, with Washington’s Birthday, Memorial Day, and the Fourth of July set aside 
to train students how properly to celebrate these American holidays.59 Still, according to 
Commissioner Faulkner’s 1906 annual report, most students did not make it beyond the 
fourth grade. Illiteracy persisted as a problem throughout the period, while at the same 
time U.S. investment in the island continued to grow and tie Puerto Rico increasingly to 
the North American mainland’s economy. 60 
 School curriculums contained sections of reading, writing, arithmetic and some 
industrial training. Schools increasingly became places to receive a basic education in 
order to enter an economy tied to agricultural exports that supplied the U.S. market with 
sugar and coffee. Few students moved on to secondary education to learn skills useful in 
white-collar jobs. Unlike in the Philippines, no large program existed to teach students to 
manufacture goods that the school could later sell for profit. The system faced the same 
persistent problem of a lack of trained teachers and adequate facilities. The rate of growth 
was slower than that found in the Philippines, with 733 schools in Puerto Rico in 1901, 
which rose to 1,712 in 1918. Students attending class quadrupled during the same period 
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but many of the gains were in urban schools. 61 This is not a suggestion that students in 
Puerto Rico received a measurably more complete or better quality education than 
students in the Philippines. The lack of quick results in the classroom did not stop the 
following comparisons with the public school system in the United States from appearing 
in the Commissioner’s early annual reports. In the 1902 report Commissioner Lindsay 
states the following:  
When contrasted with the schools which existed under the Spanish regime, 
which is the fairest means of comparison, and the one naturally employed 
by the Porto Rican people, the change is simply marvelous. The essential 
fact is that we have the American free public school in every 
municipality.62 
 Evidence of progress appears in the annual reports showing new school buildings 
and larger enrollment. Still, education still only reached a small portion of eligible 
students in Puerto Rico. A scholarship program to send gifted students to the U.S. either 
to learn a manual profession or train for college started in 1903.63 The popularity of 
higher education was more evident by 1907 when more students, from families with 
greater means, were sent to U.S. schools using private funding. In the same year the 
government expanded the program to include more students, with a higher allowance and 
also included scholarships to the University of Puerto Rico. 64 The very limited nature of 
these success stories reinforces the lack of opportunities available to most of the students 
in the rural locations of the island.  
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In 1914 Arthur Yager, the governor of Puerto Rico, stated that 70% of people in 
rural areas of Puerto Rico remained in a state of illiteracy. 65 The budget for the education 
system took approximately 30% of tax receipts, with the result that the number of schools 
and teacher staffing remained relatively flat from 1913 to 1918.66 However, attendance 
declined to the point that only 7% of eligible students attended school regularly in the 
1917-1918 school year. 67 Government administrators strove to improve the system but 
had to face the transition that Puerto Rico had undergone under American rule. Students 
leaving school, whether as dropouts or graduates, had to cope with a local economy that 
had increasingly becoming an appendage of the huge North American industrial 
economy. American firms became the dominant players in Puerto Rico, and they did not 
require a great deal of highly educated employees to fill their need for unskilled and 
semiskilled workers to support agricultural operations. The few students that did attain 
higher levels of education, typically from the more well off families, could seek positions 
in government or seek jobs on the mainland.  
A survey authorized by the University of Porto Rico and conducted by a team 
from Columbia University in 1925 wrote a report containing the findings in 1926. The 
factors that the survey team examined ignored how well the schools have Americanized 
students. The team did evaluate the effectiveness of teaching English and literacy in 
general. When it came to percentage of eligible population enrolled in school, Puerto 
Rico compared favorably with the U.S., with 17.4 % enrolled as of 1923. The most recent 
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figure for U.S. enrollment was 17.8% in 1920.68  As in the government figures the actual 
average attendance was much lower than total enrollment.69 Illiteracy stood at 80% of the 
population in 1903; yet it fell to 55% by 1920. The Columbia team reported that the 
school did a good job combating illiteracy and rates continued to decrease although at a 
much slower rate in poorly served rural areas of the island. Rural adults had a higher rate 
of illiteracy than children that may have received some education.70  
The major issues facing Puerto Rican public education appearing in the report 
have similarities with those found in the Philippines. Rural areas of the island received 
many fewer schools than more urbanized areas as experienced in the Philippines. The 
system of public education remained one where a student typically received only three 
years of schooling before leaving. The first three primary grades contained 84% of the 
enrolled students in 1925 and continued a trend from prior years. The recommendation of 
the team from Columbia, based on this short learning time frame, differed markedly from 
the Philippines. The recommended action was to not teach English in the first three years 
of school because it was impossible to teach any meaningful skills during this allotted 
time. Instead it was felt that industrial training should finally receive more resources and 
be taught with the same import as math and science. English would be taught later to the 
few students who remained in the system after the third grade.71  
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If Filipinos wanted substantial evidence that American intentions were benevolent 
it seemed to arrive with the steamer Thomas which dropped anchor in Manila harbor in 
August 1901. Aboard the Thomas were over 600 teachers, henceforth known as the 
Thomasites, hired under contract to serve at various stations in the Philippines. The 
journals of these teachers and the stories written about them offer an emotional and 
sometimes romanticized description of them as pillars of American morality and the great 
impact their work had upon Filipinos. Just like most large groups of people this initial 
group of teachers contained a mix of individuals who had come to the Philippines for 
different reasons. Most had teaching experience in the U.S. and had graduated from 
normal (teaching) schools or colleges and hoped to bring beneficial change to the 
Philippines. Based upon most accounts, a great number of them apparently came to the 
Philippines with great enthusiasm and continued to teach despite often horrendous 
conditions. Many teachers developed close relations with the Filipinos in the areas they 
had been assigned. The pressing need to find teachers meant that a few arrived with lesser 
qualifications. Some also came across the Pacific with less noble goals ranging from 
making a profit to just finding adventure. The inability of the Department of Public 
Instruction to quickly disperse the Thomasites to their posts, largely due to a lack of 
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facilities and the risks from the ongoing insurgency, did not help matters but when 
teachers did show up in a poor village they were welcomed and generally acted as 
ambassadors of goodwill.72  
 Under the administration of Fred W. Atkinson the Department of Public 
Education grew quickly and almost haphazardly due to the ambitious goals that had been 
set for it. Enthusiasm remained strong and a push existed to expand the system to include 
more students. Primary schools, high schools and a university system needed to be set up 
or reestablished and existing facilities expanded while curriculums were created to 
indoctrinate Filipino students in American theories of freedom.  Atkinson did not have 
the liberty of waiting for the system to be built and instead had to constantly show 
improvement in the number of Filipinos that had access to some form of instruction.  
Early into the occupation of the territory, the U.S. Congress decided that the 
administration of the Philippines, unlike Puerto Rico, should be a largely self-sustaining 
enterprise. This decision, along with a policy to limit capital investment from the U.S., 
caused a constant shortage of funds to run the government, which also included the 
maintenance and expansion of the schools. This shortage remained a problem throughout 
the period of American rule and hamstrung efforts to provide high quality education to an 
expanding school population. The annual reports from the education department and the 
Taft commission describe the ongoing expansion of schools and increases in student 
populations, but because resources remained slim, the process had the effect of reducing 
the quality of training in order to stretch the system. The new regulations imposed by 
Americans, the continuing war and having teachers spread across the countryside added 
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to the challenges of attempting to provide a quality education.  A report in 1901 boasted 
that 150,000 Filipino students enrolled in the primary school system during that school 
year, but in fact only an average of 75,000 attended on any given day.  Between 3,000 
and 4,000 Filipino teachers provided instruction in this system, roughly half of whom 
were simultaneously attending at least an hour of English lessons each day in order to 
fulfill the goal of conducting all instructions in English.73 Indications of an overburdened 
system continued in 1902 when reports show that establishing the number, and identity, 
of teachers employed at the municipal level was impossible because of the constant 
appointments and dismissals resulting from various reasons. Enrollment had increased to 
200,000 students in the primary school system; yet, daily attendance averaged only 
65%.74  
During the early years of civil administration it remained important both to win 
over the hearts of Filipinos and to staff the government and education system with people 
that shared in the mission to uplift Filipinos and teach American values. An excerpt from 
the Philippine Commission report of 1902, which came from a transcript of a speech 
made to teachers about to leave for the Philippine countryside and their school 
assignments, laid out the noble goal that brought them to the Philippines:  
Every interest of the United States which is properly the concern of an 
American citizen becomes a matter which we must not only attend to 
punctiliously, but must rouse zeal for in others who are now under the 
same flag. And we are not only teachers and citizens but men (and women 
of course) who have the interests of humanity at heart. No less than man’s 
highest development in every relation of life, moral as well as intellectual 
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and political, is the goal we have set for ourselves; and we have not caught 
the spirit with which our country occupies these islands if we have come 
here without the determination to make these ideals contagious. If we 
believe that honesty, purity and truth are and forever will be beyond the 
reach of the native Philippine character we had better go home at once and 
agitate for an abandonment of the islands…The American teacher, then, 
comes to these islands not as a contract laborer but as a representative of 
the Government in one of its branches; he stands for all that is included in 
the word citizenship, and he is concerned with all that is human.75 
 Both American and Filipino teachers faced challenges in performing their 
assigned responsibilities. Most Filipinos, including teachers, lacked fluency in English 
while American teachers rarely understood Tagalog or Spanish. A shortage of basic 
facilities and supplies, especially in the countryside, meant that a teacher needed to use 
whatever they had at hand. The sporadic nature of communications, and payroll, induced 
low staff morale and did nothing for the level of instruction students received. Friction 
from Filipino parents coming from various economic classes over the usefulness of the 
curriculum also affected attendance. Poor sanitary conditions and continuing warfare 
helped to spread cholera and smallpox epidemics that temporarily reduced attendance. 
76American administrators in 1902 wanted to focus on industrial training, similar to that 
provided in U.S. Indian Schools, because according to superintendent reports, Filipino 
parents had absorbed the corrupting influence of Spaniards and their disdain for honest 
work. Oddly, this argument mirrors the position used to remove American Indian 
children from the corrupting influence of their families and send them to off-reservation 
boarding schools. Added to these difficulties, a persistent shortage of trained teachers 
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prevented any serious consideration of making attendance at schools compulsory. The 
system simply did not have the buildings, people or money to provide education to all 
Filipinos of school age.77  
 Changes in the curriculum mirrored the fluctuation in leadership that took place in 
the Department of Public Instruction. Superintendent Fred Atkinson entered office in 
1900 but resigned his position effective December 31, 1902. David Prescott Barrows 
assumed the role of Superintendent of Public Instruction in August of 1903. He zealously 
aimed to provide literacy training to children, especially from poor backgrounds, which 
would provide them with the basis and proper tools to break the bonds of subservience to 
ilustrados and  principales. In the annual report from 1903 Barrows details how the 
opening of the Philippines to more commerce benefitted a very small part of the 
population, namely those literate in Spanish and at the same time offers a small 
compliment to the prior regime. While the wealthy enjoyed political power and economic 
freedom, the poor, lacking education and the “charm and grace of Spanish manners” 
remained submissive.78 Under the direction of Barrows the Department of Public 
Instruction set out to provide a curriculum that would teach literacy and the importance of 
participating in their communities to Filipino students. Industrial training remained a part 
of the curriculum but reading and writing increased in importance.79 His first annual 
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report stressed the importance of increasing the teaching staff of primary school teachers 
from 3,000 to 10,000 in order to teach 600,000 students.80 
 Expansion of the school system continued briskly over the first several years of 
civilian control. The number of school structures built or taken over increased and more 
students enrolled but the available resources could not handle all of the students. Actual 
attendance and the number of hours taught remained low. Annual reports from 1902 
estimated just over 1.4 million children of eligible school age in the Philippines. 
Enrollment in the schools totaled 193,000 or about 14% of the eligible student population 
in the country. These statistics are well below those reported during the period in the state 
of Georgia, where no compulsory schooling laws existed. Georgia’s Department of 
Education could boast that 76% of the eligible school-age population attended public 
schools. Meanwhile in the city of Boston, where compulsory schooling did exist at the 
time, annual reports showed that 92% of eligible students were enrolled. The average 
attendance reported for the Philippine school system did provide hope – 72% versus 
Georgia schools’ reported 53%.81  
 Schools continued to be built or acquired and other educational resources 
provided. The addition of new fees in 1902, collected by municipalities helped to provide 
funding for the training and staffing of teachers in villages. Announcements of new 
buildings permeated the early annual reports. Manila received a new circulating library 
and museum. The construction of eleven provincial secondary schools continued and 
would soon join the twenty-three that had already been completed. While there were 
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many signs of progress, there was also criticism. An American teacher in Panay sent a 
letter to a supervisor complaining about the poor work habits of Filipino assistants that, in 
his opinion, had poor work and attendance habits. A district superintendent accused a 
provincial president of taking Igorrote children (Igorrotes are a mountain people residing 
on Luzon and have historically been viewed as primitives by both Americans and 
Filipinos) for municipal labor to the detriment of their school attendance82. These signs of 
growth along with critical reports are understandable considering the brevity of time 
between the beginning of the occupation and start of civilian administration. However, 
issues continued to multiply as the system took on a larger share of eligible students.  
 Between 1902 and 1909 David P. Barrows ran the Department of Public 
Instruction and implemented curriculums that were meant to produce civic minded 
citizens able to hold their leaders accountable. Barrows’ strategy appeared to follow the 
spirit of the previous public statements from President McKinley, Elihu Root and 
Howard Taft touting the beneficial aims of the plan to educate Filipinos and mold them 
into responsible citizens that could handle the privilege of being free, within an American 
colonial system. The emphasis on the plight of students from lower economic classes 
evinces itself in Barrows’ 1903 report:  
The greatest danger at present menacing the success of our schools is that, 
pleased with the capacity and cleverness of the youth of the cultivated 
class, and desirous of forwarding his success along the higher levels of 
education, we may forget the primary and essential importance of 
educating the child of the peasant.83 
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Later in 1905, Howard Taft, reporting as governor of the Philippines, made a statement 
praising U.S. intentions while also drawing comparisons with the Dutch, British and 
French; major imperial powers in the region:  
The chief difference between their policy and ours in the treatment of 
tropical people arises from the fact that we are seeking to prepare the 
people under our guidance for popular self-government. We are 
attempting to do this by primary and secondary education offered freely to 
the Filipino people…Our chief object is to develop the people into a self 
governing people, and in doing that popular education is in our judgment 
the first and most important means.84 
Barrows’ plan called for a drastic increase in the number of primary school teachers to 
10,000 from the existing staff of 3,000. He believed that a system staffed at such a level, 
also assuming adequate facilities, could handle the education of 600,000 Filipino students 
at one time.85 However, politics, finances and conflicting theories of Filipino needs 
impeded and ultimately hamstrung any plan to focus on spreading quality public 
education to the majority of children belonging to poorer families. 
 The funding provided for education represented a significant portion of the 
overall budget of the government but still could not cover the plans of Superintendent 
Barrows. Policies that prevented large scale capital investment in the Philippines, such as 
limits on the amount of acres that could be purchased effectively barring foreign 
corporations from investment, kept tax receipts and money available for schools from 
increasing. The government of the Philippines spent $.25 per capita for education in 1903 
while Puerto Rico’s administration, which received large amounts of foreign investment, 
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spent $.84. In the United States between $.80 and $6 per capita went to education, 
depending on the region. American teachers and the education bureaucracy absorbed 
two- thirds of the education budget. The total funding for the first five years of American 
rule fluctuated between $1.2 and $1.4 million but each year that represented a smaller 
portion of the overall government budget. School enrollment continued to increase, 
schools were built and more teachers hired necessitating the spreading of education 
resources ever more thinly.86  
 Shortly after his arrival Barrows had to ration education and reduce the number of 
years of primary education from four to three in order to increase the number of enrolled 
students without increasing staffing and structures.87 At the same time a shortage of 
American teachers, and difficulty in finding replacements from attrition, led Barrows to 
implement a plan where the most gifted Filipino students also received concurrent 
training as teachers. After three years of training and supervised teaching, they would 
instruct classes on their own. The overriding goal of expanding enrollment forced the 
implementation of this plan despite the knowledge that the quality of instruction would 
probably decline.88 Enrollment continued to increase and in 1904 stood at 227,600 of 
which 220,000 attended primary school with the rest in intermediate and secondary 
school.89 The Commission government passed Act No. 1225 the following year to allow 
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the hiring of a larger number of Filipino teachers at a lower pay scale, $120-$160 per 
year instead of $900-$2,000 per year. 90 
 In 1905 the Commission government terminated the land tax, a major source of 
education funding. The original intent was to alleviate the devastation caused by a 
livestock epidemic that killed many of the water buffalos used to accomplish heavy farm 
work. Suspending the land tax offered a means to relieve some of the pressure on 
landowners, some of whom now occupied seats in the new Philippine legislature. The act 
to suspend the tax passed and removed funding for more than half of the budget for 
primary schools in 1905. The school administrators correctly surmised that legislators 
would not quickly reinstate the tax. A precedent had already been set in Manila where 
several years previously a local tax used to fund education had been suspended and never 
reinstated to the previous levels. Emergency funding from the Philippine treasury and the 
release of relief funds authorized by the U.S. Congress covered most of the loss in 
funding, but Barrows had to scale back any expansion plans in the interim. 91 
 Barrows pursued an ambitious plan in 1904 to expand primary education without 
a correspondingly large increase in his operating budget. He had orchestrated a threefold 
increase in the number of elementary schools by the time he resigned in 1909. The total 
enrollment in March 1905 had surpassed 500,000, doubling enrollment over the previous 
school year. Average attendance was much lower. However, school districts could not 
handle the increase despite the addition of many Filipino teachers and aides. Staff 
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increases came at the expense of gradually lowered salaries especially among the native 
teachers. Reports that most students received, at most, a noncontiguous two to two and a 
half years of schooling before dropping out of the system reinforced the opinion that 
serious problems accompanied years of expansion and changes needed to be made.92 
The public school system of Puerto Rico matched that of the Philippines in also 
requiring massive resources to expand its reach across all areas of the island. When the 
U.S. took over the island, it was reported that only one purpose-built school existed on 
the island with the rest of the structures made up of whatever space had been available. 93 
Appropriations slowly increased over the first decade of American rule and avoided steep 
cuts that might have interfered with long term plans. Enrollment and average attendance 
also increased steadily but never as quickly as commissioners wished, especially in rural 
areas. Annual reports of the governor and commissioner repeatedly focus on ways to 
address poorly served rural areas, but the “graded” schools in cities and towns often 
received more attention and increases in the numbers of schools and teachers.  
Civilian commissioners began to arrive with regularity on the island, and a 
strategy took shape that remained relatively intact through some difficult times. The 
intent had been for each to serve four year terms, and aside from a few resignations 
during this early period, the planned transfer of office worked. Commissioner of 
Education McCune could proudly state in his 1902 report, written four days after his 
arrival in Puerto Rico, that the work of his predecessor had increased the number of 
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schools and enrollment by 20% and teachers by 14%.94 Growth in school structures took 
time to grow significantly and actually decreased and fluctuated below 1902 levels until 
finally surpassing that total permanently in 1908. Simultaneously an increase in total 
enrollment took place that did not abate until the 1914-1915 school year. Commissioner 
Falkner, in his annual report for 1905, explained the reasoning behind his call for all 
superintendents and teachers to bring in as many students as possible into the schools. He 
had needed to reduce the number of schools because appropriations lagged behind the 
prior year by approximately $20,000 and it would be better to get as many children into 
the schools to get some education.95  
Raw enrollment numbers increased until hitting a stretch of decreases caused by 
the war in Europe and later America’s entry.96 The impressive increase came partly as a 
result of the growth in urban school populations but a greater proportion came from the 
practice of double enrollment in rural schools. The practice entailed having one teacher 
teach two classes, each for half a day. Commissioner Dexter explained in his 1910 report 
how it would be impossible to do away with double enrollment when less than half of the 
children on the island got to school. He also thought it beneficial to let the children return 
home and help their families at work.97 Rural schools also only went up to the sixth 
grade, by 1917 only the fourth, while schools in cities and towns taught all eight grades. 
                                                 
94 U.S. Department of State, Second Annual Report of the Governor of Porto Rico (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1902) 41. 
95 U.S. Department of State, Report of the Governor of Porto Rico to the Secretary of War 1905 
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1905) 9-11. 
96 See  Appendix C 
97 U.S. War Department, Report of the Governor of Porto Rico to the Secretary of War 1910 (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910) 167-168. 
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Expansion into rural areas came with the acceptance that pupils would have a sparser 
learning experience.98 Results in this area would reflect poorly in the Columbia 
University education survey done in 1925.  
Puerto Rico avoided the tug of war between academic and industrial training as 
the system grew. The closure of specific industrial training schools forced the addition of 
classes in the primary school curriculum but it did not precipitate a crash program that 
reduced the teaching of civics, English, or American history. The few products that 
students produced, when compared to the Philippines, show up in commissioner reports 
as supplies to be used in the classrooms or school offices rather than as merchandise for 
direct profit.99  
The budget for education in Puerto Rico avoided deep cuts that enabled the 
sources of revenue to remain in place. Appropriations fluctuated mildly but generally 
increased from 1900 to 1918, aside from one instance of a special legislative increase of 
$1 million in the 1913-1914 fiscal year. Sufficient revenue depended upon the 
increasingly lucrative export of sugar, coffee and other agricultural products from 
plantations managed by American corporations.100 Funds allowing schools to function 
came from the insular government’s balance from tariffs on commerce and the municipal 
school boards share of taxes on the assessed value of property. Whereas in the 
Philippines many of the annual reports bemoan the reduction in budgets and the 
                                                 
98 U.S. War Department, Report of the Governor of Porto Rico to the Secretary of War 1914 (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914) 358-359. 
99 U.S. War Department, Report of the Governor of Porto Rico to the Secretary of War 1915 (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915) 330-332. 
100 “Progress in Porto Rico”,  New York Tribune Illustrated Supplement, June 21, 1903, p. 4. 
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insurmountable number of students to educate, in Puerto Rico the number of children 
admitted to school exceeded the appropriations designated for education. The Puerto 
Rican legislature in the period covered often voted for measures to increase 
appropriations for the hiring of more teachers and the floating of bonds to pay for 
additional schools.101 However the legislature did prevent the funding of any further 
industrial training in stand-alone schools in 1906 despite the urging of the 
Commissioner.102  
A decade after Puerto Ricans received U.S. citizenship, a survey of the public 
school system judged it a partial success. Expansion had succeeded in reducing the 
illiteracy rate and bringing education to a number of people comparable to the rates in the 
United States at the time. The survey focused on the same problem that most previous 
Commissioners of Education already knew of and included in their reports – the general 
lack of success in rural areas.103 Coupled with rising unemployment and an economy 
increasingly based on a few major export crops, the lack of opportunity led many 
graduates, now citizens, to seek employment in the U.S., which was an opportunity not 
open to most Filipinos. The 1925 survey of Puerto Rican public education estimated that 
some 60,000 Puerto Ricans were then residing and working in New York.104  
 
                                                 
101 U.S. War Department, Report of the Governor of Porto Rico to the Secretary of War 1913 (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1913) 55. 
102 U.S. War Department, Report of the Governor of Porto Rico to the Secretary of War 1911 (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911) 177. 
103 Columbia University, International Institute of Teachers College, A Survey of Public Educational 
System of Porto Rico, 64-65. 
104 Ibid., 262. 






INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION AND ACADEMICS 
 
 
 Once Barrows neared the end of his career in the Philippines, and after he left, 
changes to the system called into question the goal of public education. Expansion of 
industrial training in the curriculum was introduced in 1907 at the expense of academic 
training. Frank R. White became the superintendent in December 1909 under the 
administration of Governor W. Cameron Forbes and implemented plans to change the 
direction of public education. He organized a department within the Bureau of Public 
Instruction to oversee the industrial training, which he wanted as the major focus of 
public education and in the process undoing much of what Barrows had hoped to 
accomplish with the schools. Shortly after assuming office, White rolled out a new 
curriculum that expanded industrial training to ninety minutes a day from the hour it had 
taken previously during a typical five hour class day. The time allocated to industrial 
training came from reducing courses such as literature and mathematics. First and second 
graders learned simple skills that later as third and fourth graders would allow them to 
produce items, such as gloves, lace and baskets, for market. Whereas in the U.S. 
industrial education accompanied other classes in importance, in the Philippines it 
usurped the time allotted to general education. Students spent an increasing amount of 
time assembling cheap products that administrators hoped would allow them to earn a 
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living after finishing school. During White’s administration, more than 90% percent of 
primary school students received an increasing amount of industrial training.105  
Further changes came a year after Barrows departure, which brought about a 
crisis in the Filipino school system.  White, deciding that budgetary problems required 
drastic measures, ordered the closing of almost 800 primary schools and the dropping of 
delinquent students from the system. Over the course of the next two school years 
enrollment dropped from 610,000 to 440,000. Governor Forbes, realizing that the cuts 
had been a step in the wrong direction, decided to reverse most of the closures and 
assigned emergency funds to reopen some of the schools as a stopgap. White’s 
curriculum changes that expanded industrial training remained in place.106  
 Industrial training assumed an even greater focus in the years after White’s death 
in 1913. A General Sales Department was created within the Bureau of Public Instruction 
in 1916 to oversee the sale of merchandise made in the schools. Separate offices were 
also opened in each school district responsible for the marketing and selling of products 
made by students. The department attempted to generate profits and income stream for 
the schools from the sale of the various products that students produced such as hats, 
baskets and mats. Warehouses regularly became full of items produced by students for 
                                                 
105 Glenn Anthony May, “The Business of Education in the Colonial Philippines, 1909-30” in Colonial 
Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State, ed. Alfred W. McCoy (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 154-155. 
 
106 Glenn Anthony May, Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of 
American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913 (Contributions in Comparative Colonial Studies)  (Westport & 
London: Greenwood Press, 1980), 120-124. 
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which no ready market existed. The repeated failure of this sales effort resulted in the 
omission of any sales figures starting in the annual reports in 1919.107  
The Jones Act, signed by President Woodrow Wilson in 1916, gave the 
Philippines a bicameral legislature with an American governor/overseer and also 
accelerated the Filipinization of the government bureaucracy. The handing over of many 
municipal roles to Filipinos had already been gathering momentum as American 
employees realized that they probably did not have a future in the Philippines. However, 
the purpose of education, especially primary and intermediate, retained the profound U.S 
influence instilled during the last decade and a half of American rule. Teaching staffs and 
student enrollment continued to grow faster than the budgets could accommodate, and the 
curriculum for primary and intermediate schools, representing the limit of education for 
the vast majority of Filipino students, remained wedded to an emphasis on industrial 
skills.  
In 1925 the U.S. Congress sent the Monroe Commission to the Philippines to 
conduct a survey of the entire Philippine education system. Headed by Paul Monroe, it 
fanned out across the archipelago, visiting schools and examining the results of the 
system installed by the U.S. Their findings reveal a school system functioning at largely 
the same level as it had been twenty years earlier.108 
                                                 
107 Glenn Anthony May, “The Business of Education in the Colonial Philippines, 1909-30” in Colonial 
Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State, ed. Alfred W. McCoy (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 154-155. 
108 Glenn Anthony May, “The Business of Education in the Colonial Philippines, 1909-30” in Colonial 
Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State, ed. Alfred W. McCoy (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), 157. 
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The commission found that education in the Philippines was geared towards 
teaching students in quantity rather than providing a high quality education. Slightly 
more than 95% of students in the system in 1923 were in the first seven grades (Primary 
and Intermediate). A large majority of students, 82%, failed to reach the fifth grade and 
these students performed only at the level of U.S. second graders according to tests 
administered to 32,000 pupils by the commission.109 The relatively small population of 
students that attended high school and university received training in skills for which the 
job market in the Philippines had no particular need. Graduates and partially trained 
students found themselves jockeying for too few jobs in the government bureaucracy. 
Tests given to over 1,000 teachers showed that many of them had been hastily and 
incompletely trained and were unable to fix high student failure rates. They described the 
industrial training program as inefficient and outdated. No demand existed for the vast 
amount of products the students produced and inventory went unsold. The commission 
emphasized the importance of updating the industrial training program while also 
recommending the halving of the number of academic schools. Fewer academic offerings 
would force students into an updated vocational training program and direct them away 
from white-collar employment. The commission’s assessment describes a system that 
attempted to do too much, too quickly, with inadequate resources. Its solution was not to 
rely upon teaching Filipinos to be like American citizens; rather pragmatically they 
recommend emphasis on training programs for trades that supported local industries and 
                                                 
109 Paul Monroe,  A Survey of the Educational System of the Philippine Islands  (Manila: Bureau of Print, 
1925), 7.  
    62 
 
 
direct employment in agriculture with the plantations and companies predominantly 
owned by the powerful ilustrados and principalia.110   
 Industrial training in Puerto Rican school curriculums held a place of similar 
importance as other subjects but often fell victim to insufficient resources. Schools 
established specifically to provide industrial training were established in 1903 but a cut in 
funding forced their closure in 1907. Primary school teachers acted as the main source of 
industrial training, and each was expected to teach students what they knew using the 
equipment and supplies at hand. Even the teaching of agricultural skills, in a heavily 
agricultural country, was left to whoever happened to have some training. Lack of funds 
played its part in keeping adequate supplies from industrial/handiworks training. 
However, the focus on other training and Americanization kept the curriculum from 
deviating too far towards industrial skills. The teaching of this  skill was judged to be so 
lacking that a 1925 study done of the Puerto Rican public school system recommended 
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EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION 
  
 
 The Foraker Act, also known as the Organic Act of 1900, passed by Congress in 
1900 and signed into law on April 2, 1900, laid out the terms for U.S. rule in Puerto Rico. 
Policies established in this law lasted until added to and amended by the Jones Act of 
1917, which granted U.S. citizenship to Puerto Ricans. The treatment that Puerto Rico 
received in the Foraker Act differed from that of the Philippines and provided a strong 
indication that the island would remain a part of the United States. Tariffs to protect 
American industries only lasted a year so that low-cost Puerto Rican products would 
eventually be on equal footing. Other duties were either eliminated or reduced to much 
lower levels so that trade would not be discouraged. The Philippines received similar 
reductions in some duties, but certain products were still subject to full protective tariffs 
because they competed with U.S. producers. The Philippines would have to wait for 
legislation passed a decade after the occupation to receive trade benefits resembling the 
benefits included in the Foraker Act. The U.S. citizenship provision would never 
materialize because along with the issue of race raised in early debates, the U.S. Congress 
had by this time ruled out annexation. The Foraker Act also provided incentives for 
capital investment, purchases of land, and establishment of U.S. businesses. Both the 




of land parcels over 500 acres by corporations, but the Puerto Rican version did not 
provide a means of enforcing it. U.S. corporations could purchase large pieces of land 
until laws were put on the books in 1935 to enforce the original provisions.112 A major 
effect of the law was to increase investment from U.S. corporations seeking to expand 
into Puerto Rico. The attraction of plentiful cheap labor and corporation-friendly policies 
drew American business to the island. In a relatively short time, Puerto Rico became a 
captive market to U.S. products.  The increase in trade provided revenue from taxes, 
which helped to fund the operation of the U.S. administration of the island to a higher 
degree than in the Philippines. Customs duties passed back to the Puerto Rican treasury 
provided a considerable sum of money to the budget with total collected duties totaling 
$771,447 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1903.113 The Act authorized an elected 
legislature which could draft bills and vote on laws but whose power was limited by an 
executive council staffed through presidential appointment. The council could veto any 
bill that made its way through the legislature. 114 The policies and structures that the 
Foraker Act established to improve the economic link between Puerto Rico and the U.S. 
make sense from the standpoint that American leaders had already decided that they 
intended to retain Puerto Rico indefinitely. 
 Keeping control of Puerto Rico presented less of a challenge to American leaders 
than any attempt to do the same with the Philippines. The debates that ensued between 
Democrats and Republicans after America defeated Spain and inherited an empire 
                                                 
112 Puerto Rico, Acts and Resolutions of the Second Special Session of the Thirteenth Legislature of Puerto 
Rico, 1935 (San Juan:Bureau of Supplies, Printing and Transportation, 1935), 418. 
113 U.S. Department of State, Fourth Annual Report of the Governor of Porto Rico  (Washington, D.C., 
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initially resembled the belief in manifest destiny. This belief did not survive the 
realization that ruling overseas possessions with large populations presented many more 
challenges than were encountered in the American West. The argument instead tilted 
toward determining the material benefits of holding territories. Captains of industry did 
not lobby Congress with a unified voice because some feared the low-cost competition 
from overseas while others longed for an opportunity to dominate newly captive colonial 
markets. The middle course of keeping Puerto Rico while limiting the growth of any 
further responsibilities in the Philippines made sense to American leaders and their 
constituents who at least thought they knew more about the Caribbean island than the 
Asian archipelago. The simple fact that Puerto Rico was geographically closer and the 
contemporary American opinion classified Puerto Ricans as nearly European due to their 
exposure to the Spanish made a distinct difference. This decision also helped to appease 
anti-imperialists and groups worried about the potential racial issues that admitting the 
Philippines to the Union would bring.115 
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 The assessment of the impact of education in the Philippines and Puerto Rico 
done in 1925 had serious concerns with past performance and the future prospects of 
public education. Neither system had made great improvements in literacy or managed to 
reach the poorer, more rural, segments of society. A majority of children still did not see 
the inside of a classroom, especially in Puerto Rico where attendance hovered around 
10% of those eligible to attend. Those students that did attend classes typically did so 
sporadically and did not reach beyond the third or fourth grades. Hiring trained teachers 
remained a problem for both territories as was providing sufficient salaries to those who 
were hired. Both public education systems had problems securing the budgets that their 
superintendents felt were necessary due to a mix of legislative and other practical 
reasons. However, the evolving strategies of U.S. education planners and politicians 
betray differences in how they saw the Philippines and Puerto Rico fitting into an 
American empire. Long before the decision was made to give Puerto Ricans U.S. 
citizenship, the public education system in the Philippines started to stray from the 
original goals of creating educated Filipinos with republican values.  
 The actions of the U.S. government during the first decade after the conquest of 
the Philippines and Puerto Rico betray a marked decline in enthusiasm for the increasing 
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need for resources in appropriations and personnel to develop these territories. The 
Philippines in particular presented a conundrum because the first several years had been 
spent putting down an insurrection by forces representing Filipino independence. 
Philosophies incorporating manifest destiny had indeed worked better when the U.S. was 
dealing with an American West that had been depopulated of Indians by disease, 
starvation and war. In contrast, ruling millions of Filipinos as an imperial power had no 
precedent in U.S. history. Nor did the possibility of incorporating millions of what, to 
Americans were an alien people, a world away, into the Union. Puerto Rico presented 
some of the same racial and philosophical issues but genuine strategic and economic 
interests compelled the U.S. to retain the island and allow an influx of American capital 
that eventually led to domination of the economy. Puerto Rico provided a forward base 
helpful in protecting trade routes leading through the Panama Canal. The islands 
agricultural production and the view that its people would help the U.S. to gain stronger 
footholds in South American markets increased its potential importance. Changing 
administrations in the U.S. and a World War sealed the deal and by 1916 the Jones Act 
set Filipinos on a course for eventual independence, while Puerto Ricans received 
citizenship and a more permanent bond with the U.S.  
 Similar factors explain why education in the Philippines and Puerto Rico 
generated such poor results despite periods of heavy investment. American attempts to 
implement a system of education designed to make Filipinos duplicates of American 
citizens failed in many respects. Based upon initial statements from politicians and 
administrators, education would help to set the majority of Filipinos free from corrupt 
leaders left over from centuries of Spanish rule. But the die was cast soon after the U.S. 
    68 
 
 
victory when political wrangling in the U.S. Congress led to the policies in the Philippine 
Organic Act that prevented a large increase in capital investment in the Philippines while 
also expecting the territory to be largely self-sufficient. These policies left the 
government underfunded, avoided the unpalatable possibility of American citizenship for 
Filipinos, and rapidly transitioned many government roles back to native leaders. Despite 
the statements of prominent leaders like Howard Taft that Filipino self-government 
would come only after many generations of tutelage under an American administration, 
there was too much resistance at home to entrenching the colonial relationship between 
the Philippines and the United States. Policies and legislation that placed limits on the 
amount of foreign investment capital also protected the interests of Filipino economic and 
political elites. Tariffs reduced the amount of investment and trade, especially with 
countries other than the U.S., and more importantly affected the amount of tax revenues 
the Philippine government could collect.  U.S. administrators found that in order to 
operate effectively they needed to allow Filipino leaders a fair amount of leeway in return 
for their help in supporting legislation to raise funds for the government.  
This forced the U.S. administration to reassess its original plan to enlighten 
Filipinos. They could no longer conceive of actually freeing Filipinos from the same 
caciques that they depended upon to keep the government running and the people passive 
despite what they judged to be a political establishment rife with the corruption taught by 
the Spanish. Instead, appropriation bills, including those meant to fund education had to 
tread a fine line and avoid affecting Filipino elites too harshly in order to receive their 
support. The new relationship barely helped to keep pace with the expansion of the 
school system, but soon it became essential for the government to be more practical and 
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increasingly rely on poorly paid and trained Filipino teachers to teach larger classes for 
fewer hours. Strategies to concentrate on industrial training instead of academics 
expanded and even went as far as establishing a sales department within the school 
system to market the goods created by students. Later, education surveys brought the 
failings of the system to light, but Filipinos still sent their children to school in order to 
give them what they thought might be a precious advantage. The continued expansion of 
the system reduced its effectiveness but Filipinos believed in the benefits of getting any 
education, especially if it might provide a means to a better life or job in the government. 
By any measure used in the U.S., the attempt to educate Filipinos into Americans failed 
miserably but did eventually help provide the means for an independent Philippines to 
sustain itself.  
 The reasons that education failed to fulfill its promise in Puerto Rico differed 
from those that humbled the grand plans in the Philippines. While American leaders did 
not formally laid out their intentions for Puerto Rico after the victory over Spain or the 
treaty signing, they anticipated  that the island would remain a U.S. possession of some 
sort. Politically it was more acceptable to retain Puerto Rico because of its relative 
proximity to the U.S., and because the North Americans saw Puerto Ricans as less alien 
than Filipinos. The Foraker Act, or Organic Act of 1900, authorized the lifting or 
reduction of tariffs from Puerto Rican trade after a year of occupation, which put the 
territory and its government services on a far better financial footing than the Philippines 
found itself at that time. Policies encouraged the flow of money from the U.S. and 
investments and trade surged between the countries. Money from the increased custom 
duties, instead of being deposited with the U.S. Treasury in trust, reverted directly to the 
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Puerto Rican insular government to fund operations and improvements. The unrestricted 
influx of American capital and businesses displaced many of the Puerto Rican planters 
and merchants with managers working for absentee corporate owners. Large American 
plantations owned by corporations became an increasing part of the economic landscape 
and required a pool of workers with relatively little education to work in the fields or in 
supporting trades. The school system met the minimum requirements of the local 
economy and provided a basic education to a relatively small population of students. It 
also granted opportunities to a select few to attend higher education in San Juan and the 
United States, similar to the policy in the Philippines. At the time, Puerto Rico’s 
agricultural economy could function without a school system that produced many 
graduates and the risk of popular unrest remained low. Steps to offer expanded quality 
education were not necessary in the short term. Geopolitically, no potential threats 
existed to U.S. rule in Puerto Rico as appeared in the Pacific where several empires, 
Japan eyed as the primary threat, surrounded the Philippines. 
 The acquisition of overseas territories strained the political environment and 
affected the lengths to which the U.S. would go to further democracy over commercial 
concerns. During the first five years of occupation, congressional debate over retaining 
the territories revolved around manifest destiny and the responsibility that the U.S. had to 
the natives of the Philippines and Puerto Rico. Increasingly the debates turned to the 
commercial benefits of keeping the territories as markets for U.S. goods. Pacification of 
insurgent parts of the respective societies and establishing an environment conducive to 
increasing trade became paramount.116 
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 Based upon the initial goals set forth by the American administration for the 
Filipino school system, it did not perform well. Students did not receive an education 
designed to provide them with an intellectual means of combating corrupt leaders. 
However, it did succeed in exposing a large number of students to some education and 
training. An even smaller group, the children of a nascent middle class, made it to high 
school and universities. The existing Filipino ruling class assimilated both groups into the 
patron-client system that had been a part of politics for over a century under the Spanish. 
Public education may have influenced the development of later popular and political 
movements in the Philippines, but it failed to bring about dramatic changes while the 
country was under U.S. rule.  
Public schools in Puerto Rico did a slightly better job at instructing students than 
Filipino schools according to the 1925 surveys; yet, it never fulfilled all of its promise. 
Statistics show a fairly steady growth in schools, enrollment and teaching staff but 
beneath the numbers corners were cut in order to expose additional students to inadequate 
instruction. The benefits of education never penetrated deeply into rural Puerto Rico 
during this period, and most of the gains accrued to city and town dwellers. However, as 
new U.S. citizens the option of leaving the island to seek employment on the mainland 
existed for a few. Puerto Rican legislators were also willing to increase appropriations to 
avoid the steep declines in appropriations experienced in the Philippines. Despite this the 
system almost succumbed to the same issue of having too little funding to handle its 
mandate. Ultimately it did not matter because the economic ties with the U.S. had 
become too vital and lucrative. Leaders in Puerto Rico and Washington were willing to 
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press on with their plans knowing that education issues could be resolved over the course 
of a long period of U.S. rule.  






TEACHER POPULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES 1900-1950117 
 
 
 AMERICAN FILIPINO TOTAL 
1900 889 2,167 3,056 
1905 826 3,414 4,240 
1910 773 8,275 9,048 
1915 589 9,308 9,897 
1920 385 17,244 17,639 
1925 353 25,241 25,594 
1930 307 25,279 25,586 
1935 160 27,755 27,915 
1940 97 43,682 43,779 
1945 14 46,996 47,010 
1950 8 85,396 85,404 
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EDUCATION STATISTICS IN THE U.S. & PHILIPPINES 1901-1902 
 
 
 School Age Enrollment Attendance % Enrolled Avg. 
Attendance 
Georgia118 660,870 502,877 265,388 76% 53% 
      
Boston119 94,882 87,133 77,636 92% 89% 
      
Philippines120 1,424,776 193,731 139,966 14% 72% 















                                                 
118 Georgia Department of Education, The Thirtieth Annual Report From the Department of Education to 
the General Assembly of the State of Georgia for 1901 (Atlanta, 1902), 4-5. Note: Georgia had no 
compulsory schooling laws. 
 
119 School Committee of the City of Boston, Annual Report of the School Committee of the City of Boston 
1903 (Boston, 1903), 126. Note: Compulsory schooling laws in effect since mid 19th century. 
 
120 U.S. War Department, Report of the United States Philippine Commission to the Secretary of  War 
(Washington, D.C., 1901), 677-678. 







STATISTICS ON PUBLIC EDUCATION IN PUERTO RICO121 
 
 
 Enrollment Attendance Schools Teachers Student/Teacher 
1901-1902 41,642 29,552 871 934 44.6 
1902-1903 70,216 36,308 717 1,220 57.5 
1903-1904 61,168 41,798 685 1,265 48 
1904-1905 63,223 45,201 675 1,210 52 
1905-1906 68,820 41,802 641 1,192 57.7 
1906-1907 71,696 44,218 696 1,175 61 
1907-1908 80,167 54,375 799 1,352 59 
1908-1909 105,125 74,522 998 1,608 65 
1909-1910 121,453 84,258 1,025 1,743 69.7 
1910-1911 145,525 103,102 1,042 1,671 87 
1911-1912 160,657 114,834 1,168 1,776 90 
1912-1913 161,785 117,360 1,180 1,855 87 
1913-1914 207,010 155,830 1,473 2,535 81 
1914-1915 168,319 128,376 1,494 2,461 68 
1915-1916 157,394 120,099 1,506 2,468 63.70 
1916-1917 155,657 116,779 1,666 2,676 58 
1917-1918 142,731 106,441 1,712 2,715 53 
 
                                                 
121 Values collected from the Annual Reports of the Governors and Commissioners of Education from 
1902-1918. 






PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION ENROLLED IN PUBLIC  
SCHOOLS IN PUERTO RICO122 
 
 
Year School Age Population Enrollment % 
1903 1,000,907 70,216 7.01% 
    
1908 1,060,477 80,167 7.6% 
    
1913 n/a 161,785 14.5%(est.) 
    
1918 1,223,981 143,379 11.7% 
    
1923 1,299,809 225,600 17.4% 
 
                                                 
122 Columbia University, International Institute of Teachers College , A Survey of Public Educational 
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COMPARATIVE PERCENTAGES OF SCHOOL ENROLLMENT123 
 
 
Nation/Territory Percentage of School Age 
Enrolled 
Year 
Puerto Rico 17.4% 1923 
   
United States 17.88% 1920 
   
Hawaii 15.5% 1920 
   
Japan 14.9% 1920 
   
Philippines 9.41% 1923 
 
                                                 
123 Columbia University, International Institute of Teachers College , A Survey of Public Educational 
System of Porto Rico, 153-154. 
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